The UAE's Shadow War in Sudan: Evidence of International Complicity in a Humanitarian Catastrophe
Introduction: A Conflict Hidden in Plain Sight
The war in Sudan, which erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, has become what many humanitarian organizations now call "the world's worst humanitarian catastrophe." With an estimated death toll exceeding twenty thousand people—though independent researchers suggest the actual number could be far higher—and over ten million displaced civilians, the conflict has devastated one of Africa's largest nations. Yet behind the headlines of internal strife lies a more complex and troubling reality: extensive foreign interference that has transformed a national crisis into a regional proxy war. At the center of this interference stands the United Arab Emirates, whose support for the RSF militia has been documented by multiple international organizations, investigative journalists, and intelligence agencies.
The UAE's involvement in Sudan represents more than just another instance of regional meddling. It reflects a systematic pattern of interventionism that has characterized Emirati foreign policy across the Middle East and Africa over the past decade. From Yemen to Libya, from Somalia to Ethiopia, Abu Dhabi has consistently leveraged its enormous wealth and military capabilities to shape conflicts according to its strategic interests, often with devastating consequences for civilian populations. Understanding the UAE's role in Sudan requires examining not only the evidence of direct support for the RSF, but also the broader context of Emirati regional ambitions and the strategic interests driving its actions.
The UAE-RSF Connection: Documented Evidence of Military Support
The evidence linking the United Arab Emirates to the Rapid Support Forces has accumulated steadily since the conflict began, creating what multiple observers describe as an undeniable pattern of support. In January 2024, investigative reporting revealed that the UAE was supplying weapons to the RSF through an intricate network stretching across Libya, Chad, Uganda, and breakaway regions of Somalia. This complex supply chain allowed Abu Dhabi to maintain plausible deniability while ensuring a steady flow of military equipment to its proxy force.
The sophistication of UAE support became even more apparent in subsequent investigations. In May 2025, Amnesty International published findings demonstrating that the UAE had provided advanced Chinese-manufactured weaponry to the RSF, including GB50A guided aerial bombs—marking the first documented use of these weapons in any conflict worldwide. The investigation also identified Chinese-made AH-4 howitzers and Wing Loong drones operating in Sudan, with clear evidence pointing to the UAE as the source. These weapons bore manufacturing dates from 2024, indicating recent production and transfer, and their presence in Darfur represented a clear violation of the UN arms embargo on the region.
The paper trail of UAE involvement extends beyond weaponry. In July 2024, United Nations Security Council documents revealed that Emirati passports had been discovered in aircraft wreckage linked to the RSF. While UAE officials claimed these belonged to a humanitarian delegation that visited Sudan before the war, the circumstances of their discovery raised significant questions about the true nature of Emirati personnel operating in conflict zones. Flight-tracking data analyzed by investigative journalists has shown dozens of cargo flights from the UAE into eastern Chad, a key transit point for supplies reaching the RSF. When UN experts requested cargo manifests and end-user certificates for these flights, the UAE consistently failed to provide them.
United States intelligence agencies have corroborated these findings. Reports from the Department of Defense's intelligence agency and the State Department's intelligence bureau, published in October 2024, confirmed that the UAE had increased its supply of Chinese drones and other weapon systems to the RSF. The equipment included not only advanced drones but also small arms, heavy machine guns, vehicles, artillery, mortars, and ammunition. US officials indicated that this support had intensified following the Sudanese Army's retaking of Khartoum in March 2024, suggesting the UAE was actively working to prevent an RSF defeat.
Perhaps most damning was evidence that emerged from Sudan itself. In October 2024, the Sudanese government submitted a detailed letter to the UN Security Council containing photographs of artillery ammunition boxes bearing UAE markings, along with images of Dubai-based trucks used for transporting arms that had been seized by Sudanese forces. The letter also presented evidence indicating that RSF fighters were receiving medical treatment at Zayed Military Hospital in Abu Dhabi, and included allegations that the UAE had hired mercenaries from countries including Colombia to fight alongside the militia.
Strategic Interests: Why the UAE Supports the RSF
Understanding the UAE's support for the Rapid Support Forces requires examining the strategic calculations driving Emirati policy in Sudan. Abu Dhabi's interests in the country span multiple domains—economic, political, and ideological—all of which converge to make Sudan a critical theater for Emirati regional ambitions.
Economic Motivations: Gold, Agriculture, and Strategic Infrastructure
The economic dimension of UAE interests in Sudan centers primarily on gold. The RSF controls much of Sudan's informal gold trade, particularly in Darfur, where the militia operates numerous mining sites often using forced labor. This gold flows through established networks to Dubai, where it enters global markets with minimal scrutiny. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, the RSF commander, has built a business empire worth an estimated seven billion dollars, with the vast majority of his assets and operations headquartered in the UAE. This financial relationship predates the current conflict and has only deepened since fighting began.
Beyond gold, the UAE has significant agricultural interests in Sudan. Emirati companies have been cultivating tens of thousands of hectares of Sudanese farmland, with agreements to develop hundreds of thousands more. Before the war, International Holding Company, the UAE's largest publicly traded firm, signed an agreement to develop over 162,000 hectares of farmland in northern Sudan. These agricultural projects align with the UAE's broader strategy of securing food supplies for its population through overseas farming operations. However, the Sudanese government had rejected several Emirati agricultural proposals before the war, citing concerns that the deals provided disproportionate benefits to foreign investors while offering minimal returns to local communities. The RSF, with its demonstrated willingness to prioritize foreign interests over local welfare, presented what some analysts have described as a "practical option" for Emirati investors seeking to bypass government oversight.
The UAE also maintains significant interests in Sudan's financial sector and strategic infrastructure. Joint banks operating in Sudan include substantial Gulf investments, with Emirati firms holding significant stakes in institutions controlled by the RSF and Hemedti's family. Foreign banks headquartered in Gulf states, primarily the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, collectively hold twenty-three percent of Sudan's total banking assets. Additionally, Emirati state-owned companies like DP World and AD Ports have sought logistics and port concessions along Sudan's Red Sea coast, viewing control of these facilities as crucial to the UAE's broader strategy of dominating trade routes across Africa and the Middle East.
Political and Ideological Calculations
The ideological dimension of UAE support for the RSF relates to Abu Dhabi's visceral opposition to Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Emirati leadership views political Islamism as an existential threat to Gulf monarchies and sees it as a tool used by regional rivals including Turkey, Qatar, and Iran to project power and undermine secular governance. In Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces maintain complex relationships with Islamist networks, including factions connected to the previous regime of Omar al-Bashir. From the UAE perspective, supporting the RSF serves the dual purpose of countering Islamist influence while establishing a military force that owes its survival to Emirati patronage.
This anti-Islamist stance forms part of a broader Emirati strategy observed across the region. In Egypt, the UAE backed the military coup that removed the Muslim Brotherhood from power. In Libya, it has supported General Khalifa Haftar against the UN-recognized government partly because of his opposition to Islamist groups. In Tunisia, Emirati influence has been detected supporting forces working to undermine democratic institutions that allowed Islamist parties to participate in governance. The pattern reveals a consistent preference for authoritarian military structures over democratic systems that might empower Islamist political participation.
Geopolitical Positioning and Regional Competition
Sudan's geographic location makes it strategically vital for the UAE's regional ambitions. The country sits at the crossroads of the Middle East and Africa, with access to both the Red Sea and the African interior. Control over Sudanese territory or influence over Sudanese factions provides the UAE with leverage in one of the world's most strategically important regions. The Red Sea trade route, through which an enormous percentage of global commerce passes, has become a particular focus of Emirati attention. Establishing influence in Sudan complements the UAE's network of military bases and commercial facilities stretching from Yemen to Somalia to Djibouti.
The conflict in Sudan has also become intertwined with broader regional rivalries. Egypt and Turkey support the Sudanese Armed Forces, while the UAE backs the RSF, transforming what might have been a contained internal struggle into a proxy competition between regional powers. For the UAE, preventing Egyptian dominance in Sudan serves the additional purpose of constraining a potential rival for regional leadership. Similarly, countering Turkish influence aligns with a longstanding Emirati objective of limiting Ankara's ability to project power across the Middle East and Africa.
The Human Cost: War Crimes and Humanitarian Catastrophe
The consequences of UAE support for the RSF have been catastrophic for Sudanese civilians. The militia has been accused of systematic war crimes including extrajudicial killings, torture, widespread sexual violence, and ethnic cleansing. Amnesty International has documented cases where RSF soldiers gang-raped women and young girls in front of family members, abducted victims from their homes, and forced them into sexual slavery. Over two hundred children have been raped since 2024 alone, according to documented reports.
In Darfur, where the RSF originated as the janjaweed militia that perpetrated genocide in 2003-2004, the group has resumed large-scale atrocities against non-Arab populations. Attacks against the indigenous Masalit people in the town of el-Geneina included torture, rape, and summary execution, triggering renewed accusations of genocide. Following the RSF's capture of el-Fasher in North Darfur, reports emerged of horrific violence against civilians, including attacks on displacement camps housing vulnerable populations.
The humanitarian situation has deteriorated to apocalyptic proportions. More than ten million people have been forcibly displaced, making this one of the largest displacement crises in the world. Sudan now ranks among the top four nations globally for acute malnutrition, with more than half the population suffering from severe hunger. Starvation has become a weapon of war, with both sides obstructing humanitarian access and imposing sieges on areas outside their control. The RSF began a siege of el-Fasher in April 2024, preventing food and lifesaving assistance from entering the city while simultaneously attacking civilian areas.
The international community has been slow to respond to this catastrophe. Despite overwhelming evidence of atrocities and clear violations of international humanitarian law, global powers have failed to take decisive action. The UN Security Council has proven unable to enforce existing arms embargoes or extend them to cover all of Sudan, partly due to the geopolitical calculations of major powers who maintain strategic relationships with the UAE.
A Pattern of Regional Intervention: The UAE's Broader Strategy
Sudan represents just one theater in a broader pattern of Emirati interventionism across the Middle East and Africa. Understanding this pattern provides crucial context for analyzing Abu Dhabi's actions in Sudan and reveals the systematic nature of UAE regional policy.
Yemen: A Precedent for Proxy Warfare
The UAE's involvement in Yemen's civil war, which began in 2015 as part of a Saudi-led coalition, established many of the tactics later employed in Sudan. In Yemen, the UAE initially joined the coalition to combat Houthi rebels, but quickly developed its own agenda focused on southern Yemen. Emirati forces organized, trained, equipped, and paid local militias including the Security Belt Forces and various Elite Forces units. These proxy forces, while nominally aligned with the coalition's objectives, often pursued goals that diverged from or conflicted with those of the internationally recognized Yemeni government.
The UAE's strategy in Yemen emphasized establishing control over strategic ports and coastal areas, particularly along the Red Sea and around the Bab el-Mandeb strait. This focus on maritime chokepoints reflects Emirati strategic thinking that prioritizes control over global trade routes. Emirati forces and their proxies established presence on Socotra island at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden, on Mayyun island in the middle of Bab el-Mandeb, and throughout southern Yemen's coastline. When the UAE officially withdrew most of its forces from Yemen in 2019, it maintained influence through the proxy militias it had created, which continued to receive Emirati funding and support.
The Yemen intervention also revealed the UAE's willingness to support separatist movements when doing so serves Emirati interests. Abu Dhabi became the primary backer of the Southern Transitional Council, which seeks independence for southern Yemen. This support has at times led to armed conflict between STC forces and the government they were nominally supporting, including battles for control of Aden. The UAE's backing of separatism in Yemen mirrors similar support for fragmentation in other countries, suggesting a deliberate strategy of weakening central governments that might resist Emirati influence.
Libya: Supporting Authoritarianism Against Democracy
In Libya, the UAE has been one of the primary foreign backers of General Khalifa Haftar, despite the international community's recognition of the Government of National Accord and later the Government of National Unity as Libya's legitimate government. Emirati support for Haftar began in 2014 and has included extensive military aid, aerial support, and the establishment of military bases in eastern Libya. The UAE provided Haftar with the equipment and backing necessary to seize control of eastern and southern Libya, including the country's oil crescent.
Emirati intervention in Libya peaked during Haftar's 2019-2020 offensive on Tripoli, when UAE-supplied equipment and aerial bombardment played crucial roles in sustaining the assault on the capital. When Haftar's forces proved unable to mobilize sufficient ground troops, the UAE reportedly helped facilitate the deployment of Russian Wagner Group mercenaries, allegedly underwriting portions of Moscow's intervention. This willingness to coordinate with other authoritarian actors, including Russia, demonstrates the UAE's flexible approach to achieving its objectives.
The Libya intervention illustrates several key aspects of Emirati regional strategy. First, it reveals Abu Dhabi's ideological commitment to opposing democratic transitions and Islamist political participation. The UAE viewed Libya as a critical battleground for determining whether post-Arab Spring states would allow Islamist parties to participate in governance. Second, it demonstrates the UAE's long-term commitment to its chosen proxies, with support for Haftar continuing across multiple governments and despite significant international criticism. Third, it shows how Emirati intervention contributes to prolonged conflicts and state fragmentation, as a unified, stable Libya might limit opportunities for UAE influence.
Somalia and the Horn of Africa: Building a Network of Bases and Influence
The UAE has developed an extensive network of bases and commercial facilities across the Horn of Africa, ostensibly to combat piracy and terrorism but more fundamentally to project power across one of the world's most strategic regions. In Somaliland, a breakaway region not internationally recognized as independent, the UAE established a major military base in Berbera that includes a modern naval port, a four-kilometer runway capable of receiving heavy transport aircraft and fighter jets, and extensive support facilities. The UAE also signed an agreement to build a railway linking Berbera to Ethiopia, demonstrating how Emirati infrastructure investments advance strategic military objectives.
These facilities form part of what analysts describe as a "ring of control" around the Gulf of Aden and southern approaches to the Red Sea. Satellite imagery analyzed by investigative journalists reveals that many of these installations expanded significantly following the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, with some facilities being built on territory nominally controlled by UAE allies including Yemen's Southern Transitional Council and various Somali regional authorities.
The UAE's engagement in the Horn of Africa has also included support for Ethiopia during the Tigray conflict, provision of military cooperation agreements with Chad, and involvement in the fractured politics of Somalia's federal system. These interventions follow a consistent pattern: the UAE leverages the weakness and fragmentation of central governments to establish relationships with regional actors, provides them with financial and military support, and in return gains influence over strategic locations and economic assets. As one analyst noted, because countries like Ethiopia, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan are increasingly fractured and misgoverned, the UAE can exert levels of influence that would be impossible if these nations had functioning central governments with full territorial control.
The Counter-Revolutionary Ideology
Undergirding all of these interventions is what analysts have described as the UAE's counter-revolutionary ideology. Since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, when regionwide protests called for democratic reforms against authoritarian regimes, the UAE has worked systematically to crush these movements and support the restoration of authoritarian control. Abu Dhabi's leadership views democratic transitions as threats both to their own autocratic system and to regional stability more broadly.
This ideological orientation manifests in consistent support for military coups, authoritarian strongmen, and the violent suppression of democratic movements. In Egypt, the UAE backed the military coup that removed Mohamed Morsi. In Tunisia, Emirati influence supported forces working to undermine democratic institutions. In Sudan, the UAE has been accused of involvement in multiple coup attempts and has consistently backed military factions against civilian governance. This pattern reveals a fundamental aspect of Emirati foreign policy: a preference for predictable authoritarian allies over democratic systems that might produce governments less amenable to UAE influence.
International Complicity and the Failure of Accountability
One of the most troubling aspects of the UAE's role in Sudan and other regional conflicts is the consistent failure of the international community to hold Abu Dhabi accountable for actions that clearly violate international law and contribute to humanitarian catastrophes. This failure reflects a complex web of economic interests, strategic relationships, and geopolitical calculations that allow the UAE to act with impunity.
Western Arms Sales and Strategic Partnerships
The United Kingdom, United States, France, and other Western nations continue to supply the UAE with advanced military equipment despite overwhelming evidence that such equipment is being diverted to conflict zones. In Sudan, British-made military equipment sold to the UAE has been found in the hands of the RSF, representing what critics describe as a shocking failure of export controls. The UK government assesses export license applications partly based on the risk of diversion to unauthorized end-users, and indeed recognizes that the UAE poses a risk on this count. Between 2015 and 2024, twenty-one of twenty-two single export licenses refused to the UAE were rejected specifically because of diversion concerns. Yet arms sales to Abu Dhabi continue.
This contradiction reflects a broader problem: Western governments prioritize their strategic and economic relationships with the UAE over accountability for the humanitarian consequences of Emirati interventionism. The UAE is a major purchaser of Western military equipment, providing lucrative contracts for defense industries. It is also a significant economic partner for Western nations, with substantial investments in real estate, finance, and other sectors. These economic ties create powerful lobbies that resist efforts to impose restrictions on UAE actions.
Political dynamics further complicate accountability efforts. The UAE has invested heavily in building relationships with Western political establishments, employing sophisticated lobbying operations and public relations campaigns to manage its international image. When the UK government held a Sudan conference in April 2025, British officials reportedly instructed African diplomats to avoid discussing the UAE's role in the conflict. Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited the Chad-Sudan border and described the situation as "the biggest humanitarian catastrophe on the planet," but subsequently skirted parliamentary questions about UAE involvement. The British government has also been conducting secret talks with the RSF, according to investigative reporting, despite the militia's well-documented war crimes.
The United States faces similar contradictions. While US intelligence agencies have documented UAE support for the RSF and some members of Congress have called for restrictions on arms sales to Abu Dhabi, the broader US-UAE strategic relationship has remained largely unchanged. The Trump administration's extensive business interests in the UAE and the Emirates' role in various US regional priorities have prevented Washington from taking decisive action. This pattern of prioritizing strategic relationships over human rights and international law sends a clear message to regional actors that powerful patrons can shield them from consequences for even the most egregious violations.
The United Nations and Multilateral Failure
The United Nations system has proven unable to effectively respond to the Sudan crisis despite its clear mandate to prevent atrocities and enforce international humanitarian law. The Security Council has failed to extend the arms embargo beyond Darfur to cover all of Sudan, despite repeated calls from humanitarian organizations and some member states. When the embargo is violated in Darfur itself, as documented by Amnesty International and UN investigators, the Security Council takes no meaningful enforcement action.
This failure reflects the geopolitical divisions that paralyze the UN on many issues. Permanent Security Council members including the United States, United Kingdom, and France maintain strategic relationships with the UAE and are reluctant to support measures that might damage those relationships. Russia and China, which supply weapons that the UAE transfers to Sudan, have their own reasons for avoiding robust accountability mechanisms. The result is a system incapable of responding to clear violations of international law and UN resolutions.
UN investigative bodies, including the Panel of Experts on Sudan and the Fact-Finding Mission, have documented extensive evidence of arms embargo violations and other international law breaches. However, their work depends on cooperation from member states, which the UAE has consistently refused to provide. Requests for cargo manifests, end-user certificates, and other documentation that would clarify the nature of Emirati flights to Chad and Sudan have gone unanswered. Without enforcement mechanisms to compel cooperation, these investigative efforts produce documentation of violations but no accountability.
African Union and Regional Organizations
Regional organizations including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development have proven equally ineffective at constraining UAE actions or mediating the conflict. IGAD has attempted to facilitate negotiations between the warring parties, but these efforts have consistently failed to produce sustainable ceasefires or progress toward peace. The UAE's participation in organizing humanitarian conferences for Sudan, including a high-level conference in February 2025, represents a remarkable case of an actor fueling a conflict being treated as part of the solution.
This dynamic partly reflects the UAE's extensive economic influence across Africa. With nearly sixty billion dollars already invested on the continent and pledges for ninety-seven billion more—three times China's current commitments—the UAE has become Africa's fourth-largest foreign investor. This economic leverage provides Abu Dhabi with significant influence over African governments and regional organizations, making it difficult for these bodies to take strong stands against Emirati actions. Countries that might otherwise criticize UAE intervention in Sudan often depend on Emirati investment and may be reluctant to jeopardize those relationships.
The failure of regional organizations also reflects the broader challenge of fragmentation and weakness across much of the continent. Many African states face their own governance challenges and lack the capacity or political will to confront a wealthy and powerful external actor like the UAE. Some see Emirati investment and engagement as beneficial and may not share Western concerns about the nature of that engagement. Others are themselves involved in the Sudan conflict as allies of one side or the other, making collective action through regional organizations difficult to achieve.
The Road Ahead: Prospects for Peace and Accountability
The path to peace in Sudan remains unclear as the conflict enters its third year with no sign of military resolution. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces appear committed to pursuing victory through force rather than negotiation, partly because foreign backers continue to supply them with the means to fight. The UAE's support for the RSF has been particularly crucial in preventing the militia's defeat, allowing it to sustain operations despite significant losses and setbacks.
Recent mediation efforts, including talks in Geneva and initiatives led by the United States and regional partners, have failed to produce meaningful progress. These efforts often suffer from a fundamental flaw: they focus on negotiating short-term ceasefires without addressing the root causes of the conflict or constraining the foreign actors that fuel it. The latest roadmap proposed by the Quad mechanism (the United States, African Union, IGAD, and UAE) notably fails to impose any consequences for noncompliance and stops short of calling on the UAE to halt its weapons supply to the RSF or on Egypt to end its support for the SAF.
Achieving peace in Sudan will require confronting the role of foreign intervention directly. This means pressuring the UAE to cease its support for the RSF and allowing investigations into Emirati actions to proceed without obstruction. It means extending the UN arms embargo to cover all of Sudan and implementing robust enforcement mechanisms. It means holding accountable not only the direct perpetrators of atrocities but also the foreign backers who enable their crimes. And it means centering the voices of Sudanese civilians and civil society in any peace process, rather than allowing military factions and their foreign patrons to determine the country's future.
The international community faces a choice between maintaining profitable relationships with the UAE and upholding the principles of international law and human rights. If Western nations want credibility when invoking international law in Ukraine, Gaza, or elsewhere, they cannot ignore atrocities in Sudan or continue arming the countries that fuel them. If the United Nations is to have relevance in preventing and responding to humanitarian catastrophes, it must find ways to overcome the geopolitical divisions that currently paralyze it. And if African regional organizations are to effectively serve their member states and populations, they must be willing to confront powerful external actors whose interventions undermine African sovereignty and stability.
Conclusion: The Price of Impunity
The UAE's involvement in Sudan represents a clear case study in how wealthy, well-connected states can violate international law with impunity when major powers choose to prioritize other interests over accountability. The evidence of Emirati support for the RSF is overwhelming, documented by intelligence agencies, investigative journalists, human rights organizations, and UN investigators. The humanitarian consequences of this support are catastrophic, with millions of Sudanese civilians displaced, starved, and subject to systematic violence including genocide. Yet the UAE continues to supply weapons to the RSF, continues to refuse cooperation with international investigators, and continues to face no meaningful consequences for its actions.
This impunity extends beyond Sudan to encompass a pattern of interventionism across the region. From Yemen to Libya, from Somalia to Ethiopia, the UAE has consistently leveraged its wealth and military capabilities to shape conflicts according to its strategic interests, often with devastating effects on civilian populations. The common threads running through these interventions—support for authoritarianism over democracy, preference for fragmentation over unity, willingness to enable atrocities when they serve strategic goals—reveal the systematic nature of Emirati regional policy.
The failure to hold the UAE accountable for its role in Sudan and other conflicts has broader implications for international order. It sends a message that states with sufficient wealth and strategic value can violate international law without facing consequences. It undermines the credibility of international institutions and legal frameworks designed to prevent atrocities. It emboldens other actors to pursue similar interventionist policies, calculating that geopolitical relationships will shield them from accountability. And perhaps most importantly, it perpetuates the suffering of millions of people whose lives are destroyed by conflicts that external powers fuel for their own purposes.
Breaking this cycle requires confronting uncomfortable truths about how strategic relationships and economic interests shape international responses to humanitarian crises. It requires recognizing that arms sales and investment partnerships with authoritarian states have consequences beyond bilateral relations. It requires prioritizing human rights and international law over short-term strategic calculations. And it requires a willingness to impose real costs on states that fuel conflicts and enable atrocities.
For the people of Sudan, who have endured decades of conflict, oppression, and now this catastrophic war, the stakes could not be higher. They deserve a peace that addresses the root causes of conflict rather than perpetuating the military rule and foreign interference that have plagued their country. They deserve accountability for the crimes committed against them. They deserve a voice in determining their nation's future. And they deserve an international community that acts based on principles rather than convenience, that enforces the laws and norms it claims to uphold, and that refuses to accept that any strategic interest justifies enabling genocide and mass atrocities.
The UAE's involvement in Sudan is not an isolated incident or an unfortunate miscalculation. It is part of a deliberate strategy of regional domination that treats sovereign nations as theaters for competition and civilian populations as acceptable collateral damage. Until the international community finds the will to confront this reality and impose consequences for these actions, conflicts like Sudan's will continue to rage, fueled by external actors who face no accountability for the suffering they enable. The question is not whether the evidence of UAE involvement in Sudan is sufficient—it is overwhelming. The question is whether the international community will finally choose justice and accountability over strategic convenience and economic interest.
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